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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
lature has not changed the fundamental situation that the Court held
fatal to the act. Nevertheless, the way may be open for the Court to
limit the Liquor Stores case to its facts and hold the act valid in so far as
it applies to those who expressly agree to price fixing by a trade-mark own-
er. This cannot be done, however, without a partial retraction of the
Court's basic thesis in that case- indirect price fixing.
WILLIAM V. CHAPPELL, JR.
LIMITATIONS UPON INSTRUMENTS
ENCUMBERING REAL ESTATE
Florida Laws 1945, c. 22560, §1
Florida Statutes §95.28 (Cum. Supp. 1947)
Does a statutory limitation such as Florida Laws of 1945, c. 22560, §1,
apply to an equitable mortgage? The statute provides:
"The lien of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real estate
(hereinafter referred to as mortgage), ...shall terminate and no
action or other proceeding of any kind shall be begun to enforce or
foreclose the mortgage after the expiration of the following pe-
riods, unless an extension of any such period shall have been effected
in the manner provided in Florida Laws of 1945, c. 22560, §2.
(1) If the final maturity of an obligation secured by a mortgage
is ascertainable from the record of the mortgage, the period of limi-
tation shall be twenty years after the date of such maturity;
(2) If the final maturity of an obligation secured by a mortgage
is not ascertainable from the record of the mortgage, the period of
limitation shall be twenty years from the date of the mortgage."'
I. THE NATURE O EQUITABLE MORTGAGES
An equitable mortgage arises whenever an agreement of the parties
contemplates that specific property is to be security for a debt or obliga-
'FLA. STAT. §95.28 (Cum. Supp. 1947). See FLA. STAT. §95.32 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
The provisions of §95.28 have no application to mortgages or deeds of trust executed
1
Caffee: Limitations Upon Instruments Encumbering Real Estate
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
LEGISLATIVE NOTES
tion.2 The Supreme Court of Florida has said that, since an equitable
mortgage or lien arises by operation of law from the conduct of the parties,
express or implied, equitable mortgages or liens are not within the require-
ments of the Statute of Frauds and thus may be predicated upon mere oral
agreements, as when money is lent upon the promise that certain property
is to be security therefor.3 Another class of equitable liens is found in
cases in which courts of equity, on the basis of estoppel and considera-
tions of justice, declare certain property subject to a lien to satisfy a demand
of another, as when one joint owner makes improvements on the joint
property.4
An equitable mortgage or lien is not an estate in property but is
rather a peculiar right to proceed in equity and sequester the specific
property over which the lien exists, in order to satisfy the debt or obliga-
tion.5 The creditor in whose favor the lien exists, however, has neither
legal title nor any right to possession of the property. 6 Concisely stated,
it is a special equitable "remedy for a debt."
7
Equitable mortgages or liens appear most frequently in the following
types of security transactions: a defectively executed legal or regular
mortgage,8 oral or written contracts to give a mortgage,9 oral or written
agreements made on the reliance that certain property is to stand as se-
by a railroad or public utility corporation or by any receiver or trustee thereof; nor
does the statute apply to liens under FLA. STAT., cc. 84, 85 (1941).
'Foster v. Thornton, 131 Fla. 277, 179 So. 882 (1938); Holmes v. Dunning, 101
Fla. 55, 133 So. 557 (1931); Longdon v. Wakeley, 62 Fla. 530, 56 So. 408 (1911);
Margarum v. J. S. Christie Orange Co., 37 Fla. 165, 19 So. 637 (1896); 5 Ti'M'Y,
REA. PROPERTY §1563 (3d ed. 1939).
'Craven v. Hartley, 102 Fla. 282, 135 So. 899 (1931). In this case a married
woman obtained a loan to complete payments on property she had purchased on the
oral promise to execute a mortgage. It was held immaterial that the promise to exe-
cute was in parol. See 9 THomIsoN ON REAL PROPERTY §4822 (Perm. ed. 1940).
'See Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407, 414, 106 So. 127, 129 (1925).
'Foster v. Thornton, 131 Fla. 277, 179 So. 882 (1938); Folsom v. Farmers' Bank
of Vero Beach, 102 Fla. 899, 136 So. 524 (1931); Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 407,
106 So. 127 (1925); International Realty Associates v. McAdoo, 87 Fla. 1, 99 So.
117 (1924).
'See note 5 supra. See also FLA. STAT. §697.02 (1941), providing that a mortgage
creates a specific lien and does not pass any title or right to possession.
7See Aldrich v. R. J. Ederer Co., 302 Ill. 391, 134 N. E. 726, 728 (1922).
'Holmes v. Dunning, 101 Fla. 55, 133 So. 557 (1931); Longdon v. Wakeley, 62
Fla. 530, 56 So. 408 (1911); Margarum v. J. S. Christie Orange Co., 37 Fla. 165, 19
So. 637 (1896).
'Craven v. Hartley, 102 Fla. 282, 135 So. 899 (1931); 9 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY §4821 (Perm. ed. 1940).
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curity for a debt or obligation,' 0 a deed absolute that is actually intended
as security for a loan,"1 and a mortgage on property to be acquired in the
future.'
2
As all mortgages in Florida create specific liens without the passing of
legal title or right to possession,13 the essential nature and effect of an
equitable mortgage differ but little from a regular or formal mortgage
14
executed according to the requirements of a deed.' 5 Both are enforceable
exclusively in equity courts.'
6
II. LACHES AND THE STATUTE O LIMITATIONS
The doctrine of laches as a bar to a suit in equity developed as a
peculiar aspect of equity jurisprudence, independently of any fixed
statutory limitations.' 7 If the plaintiff in equity delays to the prejudice
of the defendant in seeking equitable relief to which he is entitled, and
his delay is accompanied by important changes in the value of the property
or other changes in the situation of the defendant that would make the
"0Crown Corp. v. Robinson, 128 Fla. 249, 174 So. 737 (1937); Craven v. Hartley,
102 Fla. 282, 135 So. 899 (1931) (Statute of Frauds not applicable to equitable liens
or mortgages).
"FLA. STAT. §697.01 (1941) provides that all conveyances executed for the pur-
pose of securing payment of money shall be deemed and held "mortgages." Although
the term "mortgage" is used in this statute, such a transaction has traditionally been
considered an equitable mortgage or lien. See WALSH, MORTrAGES §7 (1934). Sev-
eral Florida cases state that such a conveyance will be "treated in equity" as a mort-
gage. See Hull v. Burr, 58 Fla. 432, 462, 50 So. 754, 764 (1909) ; Franklin v. Ayer,
22 Fla. 654, 660 (1886).
"Rose v. Lurton, 111 Fla. 424, 149 So. 557 (1933); Marion Mtg. Co. v. Teate, 98
Fla. 713, 124 So. 172 (1929) ; Davis v. Horne, 54 Fla. 563, 45 So. 476 (1907).
"See notes 5 and 6 supra.
"To distinguish between a true or regular mortgage and an equitable mortgage
or lien is beyond the scope of this article. See, however, 5 TnnANY, RFAL PaOPEaRTY
660 (3d ed. 1939): "It is somewhat difficult to understand what constitutes an
equitable mortgage in states in which the lien theory of a mortgage prevails." See
also 1 GLENN ON MORTGAGES 46 (1943): "And even under our 'lien theory' of mort-
gages, ... the mortgagee gets a legal interest in the land, which is quite different
from an equity, as that term is commonly understood."
"5FLA. STAT. §689.01 (1941). See also FLA. STAT. §697.02 (1941), Walker v. Heege,
78 Fla. 667, 670, 83 So. 605, 606 (1920) (witnesses to a mortgage not required by the
laws of Florida, since a mortgage does not pass legal title but gives only a specific lien).
"FLA. STAT. §702.01 (1941).
"Harcourt v. White, 28 Beav. 303, 54 Eng. Rep. 382 (1860); 2 PomZxoY, EQtrrT
JUIUSPRUDENCE §418 (5th ed. 1941).
3
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delayed enforcement of the relief sought unjust and unfair, equity denies
the relief to which the plaintiff would otherwise be entitled.' 8
Statutes of limitation, however, are of statutory origin' 9 and generally
do not apply to suits in equity unless made applicable by statute.20 Unlike
laches in equity, the application of which depends upon the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case showing a prejudicial delay,2 1 a statute of limita-
tions is a mere matter of time, without any consideration given to the
inequities of a delay in bringing an action.2 2 Nevertheless, there is a
strong tendency in other states23 as well as in Florida24 for courts of
equity to follow, by analogy, the corresponding limitation statutes appli-
cable to legal actions, although not bound to do so. 2 5
Even in jurisdictions in which statutes of limitation are expressly made
applicable to suits in equity, or the jurisdiction of law and equity is con-
current, laches may bar the suit in a period less than that prescribed by
the statute of limitation. In such cases the statute merely sets the outside
"5E.g., Halstead v. Florence Citrus Growers' Ass'n, 104 Fla. 21, 139 So. 132 (1932) ;
DeHuy v. Osborne, 96 Fla. 435, 118 So. 161 (1928); Norton v. Jones, 83 Fla. 81, 90
So. 854 (1922). Laches does not depend merely upon a lapse of time; but a long
lapse of time unexplained is some evidence of acquiescense. The determining feature
is the presence of circumstances showing that the delay was prejudicial. Its applica-
tion depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
"0Board of Adjustment v. State ex rel. Sossaman, 231 Ala. 520, 165 So. 761 (1936);
Uscienski v. National Sugar Ref. Co., 19 N. J. Misc. 240, 18 A.2d 611 (1941).
2°Parrot v. Dickson, 151 S. C. 114, 148 S. E. 704 (1929) ; see Hayes v. Belleair Dev.
Co., 120 Fla. 326, 332, 162 So. 698, 700 (1935), "In courts of equity, there is no such
thing in fact as a statute of limitations. ..
"See note 18 supra.
"See Sharrow v. City of Dania, 131 Fla. 641, 649, 180 So. 18, 21 (1938), "Laches
is not like the statute of limitations a mere matter of time."
"Castner v. Walrod, 183 111. 171 (1876). After stating that the question of laches
turns on the facts of each case, the court added, ". . . but when the statute has
fixed the period of limitations under which the claim if interposed in a court of law,
would be barred, courts of equity, by analogy, follow the limitation followed by law."
To the same effect see Updike v. Mace, 194 Fed. 1001 (C. C. A. 2nd 1892).
'"See Jones v. Hammock, 131 Fla. 321, 331, 179 So. 674, 678 (1937), "We recognize
the rule that such a limitation is not necessariy binding upon a court of equity. But
there is also a rule that, in the absence of contrary equities, a court of equity may
follow the law"; Hayes v. Belleair Decv. Co., 120 Fla. 326, 332, 162 So. 698, 700
(1935), ".... but in the application of the doctrine of laches courts of equity, while
not bound by, usually act or refuse to act on, the basis of provisions in statutes of limi-
tations relating to actions at law of like character." See also Flllyau v. Laverty, 3 Fla.
72, 108 (1850). The Court stated that when a purely legal claim is being asserted in
equity the statute of limitations applies to it as if the suit were in a court of law.
2"See note 24 supra.
4
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limit, but courts of equity may still refuse relief when to grant it would be
unjust and against conscience, however meritorious it might be if pursued
with reasonable diligence.
2 6
III. BAR Ov DEBT AS BARRING MORTGAGE
There is a division of opinion as to the effect that the bar on collection
of a debt has upon the mortgage given to secure such debt, when the debt
is subject to a shorter limitation period than the one applicable to the
mortgage as an instrument under seal. Florida and some other jurisdic-
tions hold that the life of a mortgage on real estate is not measured by
that of the underlying obligation, and that the mortgagee can pursue his
remedy on the mortgage by foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that the
debt or the evidence thereof is barred by the statute of limitations.
2 7
These decisions proceed for the most part on the theory that the statute of
limitations goes merely to the remedy without extinguishing the right; and
since a mortgagee has two remedies -one on the security and one on the
principal obligation - the bar of one is not necessarily destructive of the
other.2 8 In other jurisdictions, however, there is another line of decisions
holding that a mortgage is a mere incident of the debt and hence cannot be
foreclosed when the note or other evidence of the indebtedness secured by
it is barred by the statute of limitations. If an action on the debt is
barred, a suit on the mortgage is likewise barred.
29
IV. WHEN THE LIMITATION PERIOD BEGINS TO RUN
The statute under consideration provides that the twenty-year limita-
tion period runs from the final maturity date of the obligation secured by
the mortgage if such is ascertainable from the record, but if not so ascer-
tainable it will run from the date of the mortgage.3 0  Another statute re-
quires that an instrument must be properly acknowledged in order to be
2 8DeLamar Mines v. Mackay, 104 F.2d 271 (C. C. A. 9th 1939); Ussery v. Darrow,
238 Ala. 67, 188 So. 885 (1939); Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Il. 612, 156 N. E.
785 (1927); 5 PomERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE §419b (5th ed. 1941).
"Ellis v. Fairbanks, 38 Fla. 257, 21 So. 107 (1897); Browne v. Browne, 17 Fla.
607 (1879) ; Harper v. Raisin Fertilizer Co., 158 Ala. 329, 48 So. 589 (1908) ; Belknap
v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160 (1836).
2 McNair v. Burt, 68 F.2d 814 (C. C. A. 5th 1934).
"9Dupree v. Mauser, 214 U. S. 161 (1909); Morgan v. Kendrick, 91 Ark. 394, 121
S. W. 278 (1909).
3oL. STAT. §95.28 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
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entitled to record; 3 ' and the Supreme Court of Florida has held that an
instrument that has been spread upon the records when not entitled to be
recorded because of the lack of or defect in acknowledgment is, in effect,
no record at all and does not give constructive notice to subsequent pur-
chasers and creditors.3 2 Construing the word "record," then, in its proper
sense, it follows that the twenty-year limitation period will run only from
the final date of maturity of the secured obligation when that date appears
on the face of the mortgage and the mortgage has been properly acknowl-
edged so as to be entitled to record. Thus if the mortgage is not recorded
at all, or if its maturity date does not appear on the recorded instrument,
or if it is not properly acknowledged so as to constitute a "record," the
limitation period runs from the-date of the mortgage. This same construc-
tion should also apply to extension agreements. 33
V. CONCLUSION
Although the term "mortgage" has a somewhat indefinite meaning in
Florida,3 4 in its traditional sense it has signified a formally executed in-
strument attested by witnesses.3 5 These formalities are not now necessary
for its validity, however, since a mortgage does not pass legal title as at com-
mon law.3 6 In view of the fact that in Florida a mortgage creates only-
a specific lien,3 7 its legal meaning may have changed to include a great
variety of instruments that would be treated as creating a lien on property.
The Supreme Court of Florida has repeatedly said that any instrument,
however informal, that shows an intent that certain property is to be se-
curity for a debt will be treated in equity as a mortgage or lien as effec-
tively as a formally executed mortgage.3 8 Whatever theoretical differ-
ences there may be between the lien of a formally executed mortgage and
31 FLA. STAT. §695.03 (1941).
."McEwen '. Schenck, 108 Fla. 119, 146 So. 839 (1933); McKeown v. Collins, 38
Fla. 276, 21 So. 103 (1896); Keech v. Enriquez, 28 Fla. 597, 10 So. 91 (1891).
2"FLA. STAT. §95.29 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"See note 14 supra.
"See Connor v. Connor, 59 Fla. 467, 472, 52 So. 727, 729 (1910); 4 KENT's Comm.
133 (14th ed. 1896).
"See note 15 supra.
'FLA. STAT. §697.02 (1941).
"8See Torreyson v. Dutton, 145 Fla. 169, 175, 198 So. 796, 799 (1940) ; Vanderpool
Properties v. Hess & Slager, 100 Fla. 933, 935, 130 So. 457, 458 (1930); Stovall v.
Stokes, 94 Fla. 717, 741, 115 So. 828, 837 (1927) ; Pittman v. Milton, 69 Fla. 304, 320,
68 So. 658, 663 (1915); Connor v. Connor, 59 Fla. 467, 471, 52 So. 727, 729 (1910).
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an equitable lien or mortgage,3 9 the fact remains that no greater rights
accrue under the one than the other. By the use of the phrase "mortgage
or other instrument encumbering 40 real estate," 4 1 it follows that the
term "mortgage" was being used in its broadest sense, which would include
any instrument that had the effect of a mortgage. This would mean that
all the various types of equitable mortgages or liens evidenced by a writing
are to come within its terms.4 2 To hold otherwise would leave a large
number of security transactions unaffected by the statute and would cur-
tail the additional certainty in land conveyancing that is sought to be at-
tained by the statute.
Even though the statute of limitations would mark the period beyond
which the lien of a mortgage or equitable lien cannot extend, of course
courts of equity, by the application of the doctrine of laches, may bar a
suit to foreclose a mortgage or equitable lien in a shorter period when it
is shown that the delay was unreasonable under the circumstances.
4 3
An equitable mortgage that rests upon an oral agreement, however, is
not an "instrument encumbering real estate" so as to come within the
terms of the statute. The enforcement of such a lien, therefore, is still
barred only by the application of the doctrine of laches. Since courts of
equity usually follow statutes of limitation by analogy, 44 it may be held
that equitable mortgages based upon oral agreements will be barred by the
lapse of a period comparable to that prescribed by the statute under con-
sideration unless extraordinary circumstances exist that require an opposite
result. From the standpoint of conveying a clear title, free from any un-
certainty of this sort, the statute could well be amended to apply specifical-
ly to all mortgages, legal or equitable, whether in writing or not and
whether express or implied by operation of law.
WILSON R. CAVFEE
"gSee note 14 supra.
'"The term "encumbrance" was defined in Prescott v. Trueman, 4 Mass. 627, 629
(1808): "... . every right to, or interest in the land granted, to the diminution of the
value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee of it by the conveyance,
must be deemed in law an incumbrance." This would include judgments, restrictions,
tax liens, mortgages, liens, etc.
Considering the subject-matter of Section 95.28, it is clear that the term was not
meant to be used in such a broad sense.
1FLA. STAT. §95.28 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"See notes 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 supra for some common examples of equitable mort-
gages or liens.
"See note 26 supra.
"See notes 23, 24 supra.
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